From:
Geschichte des
11.(Sachs.) Infanterie-regiments, späteren Infanterie-Regiments 11 und
Grenadier-Regiments 11 von 1918-1945.
For this moment you will
find here a translated part of the Regiment history concerning page 159 to 173
and 181 to 186, (chapter 8, 9 and 10) about the period Augustus 23 1942 until
February 26 1943.
Because of the large amount
of work to translate this book I only translated here the part of the battle
Karl Lessig was wounded and was killed.
In time I will translate
all the 300+ pages.
This part begins on the 23th of august when the 11th IR is located east
of Rzhew near Subzow
The OKH supposes that the summer battle is
not a planned and prepared offensive of the Russians around Rshew, but is based
on one from the poverty of the hour born decision to relieve the breaking down
of the armies on the south part of the east front. A part of the enemy Forces
assigned around Rshew could not get away by train because most connections
leading to the south where broken off.
The Commander-in-Chief of the 9th army
writes to the troops : " the passes of the
Caucasus are reached, on the Elbrus the German imperial war flag blows, German
troops approach the Caspian Sea, the double-sided attack on
We think that 1/6th of all Russian Rifle
divisions and almost 1/3 of all Panzer brigades actually standing in the front,
around Rshew. This superior strength opposite the defensive
success of the 9th army.
8. Defence on the south
bank of the
23/8/1942. - 19/10/1942
New difficult battles will start soon so
the army and army corps announce.
In the morning of 23/8 the Infantry Regiment (I.R.
11) stands scantily ready to defence on the south bank of the
On the right with the
On the left with II. Battalion (6th Company l 5th Company, 7th Company in reserve,
Battalion headquarters stationed Northeast of Lunewo)
on approximately 1 km opposite the southwest border of Pestowo,
on the left leaning to I.R. 53. The Battalion headquarters is on the critical
point 1 km west of Lunewo.
II./Army Regiment 14 and
(Combat) Engineers 14 are instructed for cooperation.
The care base
of the Regiment is Scharlajewo (6 km’s west. of the Rgt. Gef. Std.), the Kfz (Kraftfahrzeug) area is in Schlagelewo (15 kms South. Nowo Dugino).
Already on the
evening of 23/8
brings Russian advances on the right neighbour near the railway and 4 kms south of the
position of I./I.R. 11 as well as
the first attempts to cross the river near the I.R. 53.
From 24/8
a danger place for the I. R. 11 becomes the "founder's ravine" east of Nowo
Oshibokowo between
the railway and the
Near I.R. 53 the enemy continuously tried to cross the
river. German combat patrols swim the
On 25/8
the arrival of 1 commander 12 NCO and145 man replacements for the regiment.
The strength is
now:
Fight strength Real
stength
I. Battalion . 336
548
II. Battalion . 291
458
13. Kompanie. 114
174
men
From the 29-8th to the
5th of the 9th
the enemy continuously undertakes
attempts to break trough in the "founder's ravine" and on the
railway, mostly with tank support. With the last forces under
Guidance of Oblt. Overhoff I./ll
succeeds, to repulse the enemy by fire
and counterthrust with storm artilleries and 9 enemy Tanks are shot on 29/8.
Only with a lot of trouble the right neighbour of them can keep the railway . There parts of the
In the night of 29-30/8 II./11 takes over the
left Company Section of I./11. With it the l./ll will be relieved. From 30/8., 12.00 o'clock, the
right Rgt. Border closes the railway to Subzow completely.
At the night 30.- 31/8, II./ll takes over the section close to Nowo
Oshibokowo, because the forces of the I.
Battalion dwindle more and more. Some
parts remaining with the Rgt. III. Battalion.
(Kp. Oblt. Weise) in strength
of 1/12/75 man were brought to the Rgt. Gef. Std.
There are no other reserves any more.
On 31/8 the situation with I./ll north of the
railway remains extremely critical.
The Battalion commander, Oblt. Overhoff, is wounded,
however, he remains in command. The enemy breaks trough at Nowo
Oshibokowo and moves forward on the Wolga bank, they got stuck back by minimum force. 3 Tanks
are shot. During this day just as on 1/9 the enemy fails to succeed
. The Rgt. Commander announces that the supply
of new forces is urgent. The loss at Nowo Oshibokowo already reaches an amount
of 50 dead persons and 73 wounded.
On 10.12.1942 Oblt. Overhoff becomes as 3rd member of the I.R. 11
distinguished with the Knight's Cross for the performance with the I. Battalion and for his
outstanding guidance at the railway fighting. With it the dedications of all 3
battalions of the Rgt. have been awarded by this high decoration to their
commander.
In the night of l. - 2/9 the battle group of major Niethammer (now commander of the
On 3/9 a very effective dispensation comes with the
right neighbour by dive bomber attacks. But 5 enemy tanks break trough towards Matjukowo, 2 of them are destroyed.
The attacks on the 4th and 5th of September are also blocked,
and with it the crisis around Nowo Oshibokowo is finished. On this front, which
is held by the Rgt. Stabskp.
and the remainders of the I. Battalion . and the Restkp. III. Battalion , it will be much more calm. The I. Battalion gets help
from 5 infantrie divisions with Russian
collaborators, and IIth Battalion gets parts of the 246th infantry division.
From 7/09 till 9/09. the
II. Battalion ., replaced by Corps 54, moved to Lunewo as a reserve.
The III./11, had a
minimum strength of 1 Offz., 6 Uffz.,
and 26 men, 2 sMG and 2 sGrW
and still with the III. / 549 (161. I.D.), North of Boltino (3 kms south of the
railway). Moved on 8/9 to Turbajewo (4 kms south-southwest of Rshew), unfortunately they will be
used with Kampfgruppe Niethammer
the next day.
The 14. Division announces in their condition report the losses from 2/8 to 1/9 : 3.507 man! (Including 77 officers), arrived substitutes:
595 men (with it 27 officers). It is frightening to see how the German army
bleeds to death.
The mood of the troop was reported perhaps too
optimistically, as confident. However, the opponent also seems to be weakened so
that he is not capable any more to start bigger attacks.
On 9/9., 10.00 o'clock, the Kdr.
I.R. 11 II./11 (without 7. Kp.) marches south. There
the enemy penetrated the section defended by the 161. Infantry Division (I.D.)
up to Tscherkassowo. He reaches with approximately 3
divisions 2 km south of the railroad towards Rshew and stands in the deep south flank of the I.R. 11. A
threatening situation for the Wolga front. II.
Battalion ., strengthen. by 2th Pi 14, succeeds,
partly in a difficult attack, to make a defensive line of 300 m North of Jurewo up to the height North to cover Belogurowo,
Gef. Std. Is at point 197,6. (see map)
The mixture of the groups is large.:
left of II./ll are parts of the I.R. 266; II./ll (from 17.30 o’clock subordinated to 161. Div). has 5th Kp.
3th Pi 14, remainders of the III. / 53, 8. Kp.; on
the right II./ll the Pi 256 Battalion holds Michejewo.
7th /ll protect the North of Michejewo,
6th / ll belongs to the Kampfgruppe
Stegmann (161. I.D.) which holds the attack in the western border.
Even if on 10/9 Michejewo
gets lost, one succeeds in preventing another penetrating of the Russians. Also
further south has the 129. I. D. Held. From l0.9, 1.00 o'clock, leads 72. I.D. instead of 161. I.D.
On 11/9., 10.50 o'clock, a Battalion
from “GrossDeutschland" and the Pi. Bt1. 72 will be added to the I.R. 11 to help with the
counter attack west and northwest of Michejewo. Obstlt. Leschke who is already wounded at
7.00 o’clock, leads the attack, beginning 12.40 o’clock. Some minutes later Michejewo is taken, the Russian flees. Own forces cover
positions in line point 197,1 (1,2 kms
South. Tscherkassowo) - church east of Tscherkassowo - east border Mïchëjewo
- point. 197,6 (2,5 kms east
Tscherkassowo) in a curve with the front east and
south. Under the orders of the Commander of I.R. 430 are: 1 Radfahrkp./I.R. 430, rest parts
I.R. 364, 6. / ll, remainders Pi. Battalion 256, II./ll (without 6. u. 7. Kp.), Pi. Battalion 72, 3. / Pi.
14 on a width of 5,5 kms. The rest of Stabskp. I.R. 11, 7. / ll
and 2. / Pi. 14 remain under order of the Kommander
of I.R. 11 still in their bolt position in the south border of the forest 700 m
Northeast of Michejewo.
On 11/9 Obstlt. Leschke will do it one more time. He sends out on the radio
at 15.15 h to the Div.: " Hurra,
The Russians has made it. Direct hit in the commanders
room. Waiting for them at the door. Farther
encouraging mood. "
The Gef. Std. is in the " Whitehouse
" ' west of Lunewo.
The Div. Kdr. announces to the
Commander General of the XXVII. Army Corps.: "
I.R. 11 is completely exhausted, can’t withstand no more serious attack. It
must get out!
Next day Commander in chief of the 9th army speaks his
highest acknowledgment during his visit to the Div. for Obstlt.
Leschke
who has started the attack at Michejewo and has put
through. The danger of a successful enemy attack on Rshew is warded off
one more time.
On 15/9 II./ll experiences a difficult day one more time.
Approximately 50 tanks and 500 - 700 man attack Michejewo
and the area east of it. With the help of 2 Sturmgeschützen
the Battalion succeeds with a very hard,
eventful battle, to stop the enemy, 15 blown up tanks are counted, some
breakthrough to Lunewo and 7 Tanks are destroyed there. Doctor Dr. Kastl., Battalion Doctor of II./ll,
blows 1 Tank with a magnetic mine. The Battalion commander Hptm.
Schmidt is heavy wounded. Hptm. Mauritz,
Pi. Battalion . 256 takes over the command temporarily.
On 16/9 enemy Attack preparations to attack the
II./ll were effectively
smash by a SUKA bomber. The pressure of the enemy has dropped.
Near the Wolga the I./11 is relieved at 15/9, 0.45 o'clock, by II. / 53, I./11 marches to the forest Southwest of Dubrowka
(l0 km SouthWest of Rshew) to rest.
In the afternoon Obstlt. Leschke hands over his
section to colonel Eberding, commander of I.R. 53. rods of I.R. 11 moves also away to Dubrowka. 13. Kp. remains set and
is under command to the K 54 in the left section the Division at the Wolga.
The II./ll still remains up to early 18/9 in its position East
of Michejewo
then under command of the Kdr. I.R. 430 (72. I.D.),
they marched also to the bivouac place at Dubrowka.
On 19/9 the
I.R. 11 marches (without 13. Kp.)
farther into the area 20 km SouthSouthWest
of Rshew, the Regiment and the Stabskp. go to Kulnewo, I. Battalion at Puchowo, II. Battalion at Klinzy, III. Battalion at Podsossonje.
The hardness of the fighting comes is shown in the
losses and the remaining strength:
The II./11 was led until, 11/9 by major Gerbothe,
falls ill,
Till
12/9 by Hptm. Fronzek,
falls ill.
To 15/9. by Hptm.
Schmidt, wounded
On
15/9 by Hptm. Mauritz,
From 15/9 by Hptm. Kamp,
8. / I.R. 53.
The minimum strength now counts:
1th – 3th / ll. together 1/8/48
man
5th
– 7th / ll together 2/9/93 man
9th
– llth /ll together 1/8/32 man
With the order from the 17/9 Obstlt. Leschke is thanking the troops and tells them that again
the regiment has bravely fought.
Now the Rgt. is rearranged,
from lack of man into 3 administration battalions and combat troops. The
commanders of the Battalion s are leading the Battalion s as if they were one
person. Commander adjudant and chief of Restkp.,
is taking care of the wounded, informs the families of the fallen and did some
organizational work.
Besides the man of II. Battalion and 13. Kp
that are still present in the battle on 17/9, the new battle group of major Niethammer was formed with the remainders of the I.
Battalion , III. Battalion and the Stabskp., Restkp. I. Battalion and Kradschtz. group / Stabskp. (Komp.
LT. Scherle)
III. Battalion and 4. Komp. with
Pak. group (Komp. Oblt. Böckisch)
On 22/9 after the return of II. Battalion the Kampfgr.
Niethammer will be extended. Now they enclose the
Stab (I./ll)
The Schtz. Kp. Lt. Scherle with 9 groups in
3 platoons,
The Schtz. Kp. Oblt. Volz (remainders of II./ll) and
The MG-Kp. Oblt. Bockisch with 8 sMG, 4 sGrW, 3 Pak 3,7 and 1 Pak 5 cm.
On 24/9 the Kp. Scherle, reinforced by parts Kp. Bockisch, marches to the place of action with the I.R. 53
to the
The "masses" of the I.R. 11 concerns itself
in the resting time with the usual revitalization works, road building,
building foxholes, visits services and concerts of the music corps. One also
puts substantial value on the improving of the discipline which suffers
naturally, particularly with the rear parts, during hard battle days.
On 1/10 the Staf of Kgr. Niethammer was put in the
fighting positions again. In the night from 1. to 2/10 the
The Rgt. has got 238 men at
the end of September who where educated by the reserve army, as far as it are no recovered men, in general yet is not enough for the
claims of the front. And in future it will become worse instead of better.
The men who are not attached to the Kgr. Niethammer were sent forward
to a training course of 3 weeks under major Micksch,
(from 27/9. Battalion . Kdr.
II./ll).
On 3/10 Gen. Lt. Wosch
after giving 13-months of guidance to the 14. Div. Becomes relieved. Among other
things he writes at departing: " I am proud on
14. Inf. Div. (mot) which has acquired itself within the framework of the 9th
army particularly good" He can say this really with full right! Successor
becomes Gen. Maj. Krause.
From 5/10 the Rgt. Staf of
I.R. 11 takes over the right Div. Section on the left of it K 54.
Under the I.R. 11 on the right the I. / 53, (strength
9/46/277) in the area around Nowo-Oshibokowo and on
the Volga, to the left of Kgr. Niethammer
(strength 8/54/294) on the
II./ll becomes corps reserves
subordinated to the pulled back I.R. 53.
All parts present in the rear area of the I.R. 11 work
on the renewed construction of the Rgt. Which should grow after a Rgt. order from
the 04/10 and after integration of the substitutes to the next size:
Stabskp . -Nachrichten
platoon, Kradschützen platoon (2 groups)
pioneer platoon (3
groups), Pakzug platoon (1 Pak 5 cm), Oblt. Pluntke,
I. Battalion . Kdr. Major
Niethammer
1.
Kp.: 2 platoons (6 groups)
2.
Kp.: 2 platoons (6, groups), Lt Scherle
3.
Kp.: 1 platoon (3 groups)
4.
Kp.: 2 sMG platoons (8 snG), 2 sGrW
groups (4 sGrW),
1 Pak platoon
(2 Pak 3,7 cm), Oblt. Schmidt
II. Battalion . Kdr. Major Micksch
5.
Kp.: 1 platoon (4 groups), Oblt.
Volz,
6
Kp.:
2 platoons (5 groups)
7.
Kp.: 1 platoon (4 groups), Oblt.
Wolperding
8. Kp.: 3 sMG groups (6 sMG), 1 s GrW-Gruppe (2 sGrW),
1
Pakzug (1 Pak 3,7 cm), Oblt. Overhoff
13. Kp.: 3 LIG
platoon, 1 sIG platoon, Oblt. Rust.
Exept from some disturbance fire, the front is surely quiet the next days.
On 15/10., at 4.30 , a
platoon of I./11 under Oblt. Teichgräber, begins the
combat patrol enterprise "goldfish" to the red house on the other
side of the
On order of the army the enterprise is repeated again
on the 16th to clarify the enemy's status by taking prisoners. Beginning at 4.00 hours. Strong fire from a closely occupied
edge of the forest near the river forces the platoon to go back. Thanks to the
bravery and energetic guidance of the Oblt. Teichgräber the retreat succeeds, but without prisoners and
with only 2 wounded. The Rgt. Kdr.
rewards him during the same day with the E.K. I,and the Feldwebel
Keller and 4 other Officers and men with the E.K. II,
On 17/10 in the evening Kgr.
Niethammer (I./11) is replaced,
and on 18/10. Rgt. Staf and 13. / 11 is replaced by parts of the I.R. 124 (72. I.D.).
The Rgt. moves - one can not name it a march- in separate
groups and in short walking distances in to the area around Poltino
(11 kms nordwestl. Tschertolino) where
it is gathered till 21/10. It takes till 1/11, until the whole division
has arrived in this area this because the roads are completely soaked, and the
horses are completely exhausted. A number of horses even had to be shot.
Besides, fuel has been assigned too late. The vehicles are completely run down.
Now the Div. reports as a corps reserve to the
XXIII.A.K.
The accommodations are close. It lies:
Rgt. Staf and Stafkp. in Poltino,
I./ll in Fetinino (5 kms nordnordwestl. Poltino),
II./ll
in Poltino
III./ll
in Kashino (3 kms nordostw. Poltino),
13. / 11 Kriwouliza (2 kms südwestl. Poltino).
On 7/11 Obslt. Leschke went to
Till 24/11 intense education is driven. The Rgt. had build 11 special close combat groups. The course
overview of the Div. shows that for the next 5 months approximately 1000
soldiers of all ranks on OKH-, army and Div. take the courses. In spite of
strong rainfall all sorts of marches must be done in order to let the enemy
believe of an attack of the 9th army northwards on Ostaschkow.
The Div. orders the installation of "
mud-mobile units ".
They should exist of:
Staf I.R. 11, 1st
Battalion . I.R. 11 and I.R. 53, arranged in Battalion Staf, 3 Schtz. Kp., 1 MG.Kp., 1 lIG platoon and 1-2 Pak.
At the same time a ski-Btl. Was set up in the Div., from
1 Battalion Staf I. R. 53, 1 ski Kp. I.R. 11
and I.R. 53, 1 Pi-platoon , 1 San.-sleigh-column.
On 9/11 the I.R 11 orders.,
4 Offz , 13 Uffz. and 118 men, and 21 Russian with 150 skis. The rest units
deliver their skiers. The armament exists of 2 smG, 6
lMG, 1 l Pak and 2 sGrW.
On 31/10 the Inf. Rgt.
11 and 53 were renamed in " Grenadier's Regiment (mot) " in recollection of
the fame of there predecessors. Does it matter?
On 1/11 the Div. Kdr.
visits the whole II. Battalion . "
Every separate man is tested. The Div. Kdr. is
satisfied with the units, " so it stands in the
war diary.
Besides active education in the fight during day and night
one takes also care of the psychological rest of the soldiers: contests in the
arrangement of the shelters, in the chess game and soccer games, Battalion
Championships and contest of groups singing are organized.
At the beginning of November the following Battalions
are again grown up strong by substitute and recovered men:
171 man with the Stafkp.,
509 men with I./ll (4. Kp.)
485 men with II./ll (4. Kp.)
141 man with III./ll (9. Kp.)
107 men with 13. / ll
III. Battalion places l0. Kp. In the field but according to their condition
report from the 1/11 the Div. has to few men: 104 Offz., 417 Uffz. and 2.308 men
The Division deplores the lack of good
non-commissioned officers and the still faulty retraining of officers from the
artillery and flak to the infantry.
The successful defensive battles have lifted the
confidence and pride of the troops, writes the Division. All they have is but very worn vehicles of the most different types. The
Grenadier Regiment is the Rgt. Staf
and 1st Battalion, full motorized. All one rest is part-motorized and is
harnessed. The weapons are overhaul-needy, the food is enough, and goods are
not enough, the clothing something does lack.
On 24/11 remits Gen. Oberst
Model a long call before the winter war. He thanks the troops for the previous
enormous achievements and speaks from the necessity to smash also the next
Russian winter-offensive. There will not be an own Offensive any more.
“It is about the decision of the war ".
9. Renewed defence with Ashewo,
to the west of Rshew.
25/11. - to the end of 1942
The very next day, 25/11, begins the
for a long time expected big-offensive of the enemy. Since the early
morning hours one hears strong artillery fire from the north and from the
southwest, and from Bely. 14. Div. is ready to departure. At l0.50 comes the
departure order, the Pz. Jg. Abbt. 14 that 206. I.D. subordinates to Tank Defence in
their right flank, in the well-known region of Truschkowo.
The G.R. 11, strengthened by 1 learning section of A.R. 14, is ordered as an
army reserve to Saizewo. Nothing much has changed
since July around the area on both sides of Ashewo.
The Rgt. enters already
around 12.40 o'clock into the front of the "Elferwald"
east of Ssuchucha, to the investigation of a counter
attack to the recuperation of the main defence line. The march goes across Fetinino, Dubowka to Ssoustjewo where the Rgt. arrives
at 20.30 o'clock and submits according to the order. Meanwhile, the enemy has
reached after the attack to the west the line Ploty
(west) Truschkowo.
In the evening the masses the Division follow in the
area of Dubowka and more to the north.
After nocturnal orders the G.R 11, in the meanwhile
subordinated to 206. I.D., covers early on 26/11 the
complete supply spaces for the attack to the north-east from the area of Ashewo, as ordered by XXIII. A.K.
The attack begins at 6.00 o'clock which at first makes
a good start. The enemy is thrown off its bunkers. After 3 hours the attack
still begins to falter in the forest, the I. Battalion on the right remains
north of Dorogino, II. Battalion on
the left east of Ssuchuscha. After the counter
attack in the forest the battalions are surrounded by the enemy. The 14 Div.
meanwhile take orders to the take over the positions of the right section of 206. Div. with the Gren. Rgt. 301, the fast abt. 206 and
alarm units of 206. Div. But without G.R. 53 . At 13.00 hour 14. Div. requests the corps a sensible
appeal for the withdrawal of the G.R. 11 from the forest, because completely
unacceptable losses appear. The corps can not decide, will they do it or will
they not, an example of the incapacitation of commanders still growing to the
end of the war, but they order, anyhow at 16.35 hours that G.R. 11 has to hold
in the forest.
In the afternoon the lost Saizewo
is retaken by Pi. 14 .
After fall of darkness until midnight the battalions
of the G.R. 11 were pushed out from the “Elferwald”
after high losses and with lack of ammunition. Partly they must fight to the southwest
through the containment
At 23.05 o'clock comes the corps order: defend the
line Ashewo-Saizewo-Bukarewo-Kuwschinowo-Lin ewo-Stanki (south bank of the
The section of the 14. Div. reaches from Dorogino (excl.) to the north of Saizewo and
to the right of it defends 251. I.D. with subordinated K 54,
on the left the 206. I.D. with subordinated G.R. 53.
On 27/11 the enemy continues its attacks with
infantry and tanks. Saizewo is lost again but taken again by Pi. 14.
A rushed counter attack by I./ll on Ssoustjewo fails. Oblt. Overhoff is wounded, major Micksch
leads the Battalion . Oblt. Niepold
takes over the Battalion ., which is strengthened by
l0. Kp.,
Stabskp. and parts of 12. Kp. Rushes to South and West of Ssoustjewo
in the defence.
The winter clothing had been left behind, on 26/11
as it felt too warmly, so that the soldiers freeze now on the open field.
Also on 28/11 the own attack of a Pz. Kp. on Ssoustjewo
fails after initial penetration in the place. So II./11
remains in the edge of the forest South and Southwest of Ssoustjewo.
1st Battalion rejects all attacks on Ashewo in hard
battles.
From now on to the 4th of December the
position of the G.R. 11 hardly changes.
The enemy behaves, accept from some fire and
unsuccessful attacks against Ashewo - l./ll - , very quietly in the
left Div. Section. On the contrary on
28/11 in the mornings the Russian blows up the section of G.R. 301. One
succeeds in catching the Battalion in Mischukowo. On
the right of it Saizewo becomes held by Pi. 14, as well on the left of it Urdom by
G.R. 53. Which also has to endure difficult battles.
The Div. thinks the enemy before there own front is:
4 Schtz. Div., 4 Schtz. Brig., 1 mot Brig., 2-3 Pz. Brig. And 2 Pz. Rgt.
On 30/11 Urdom is
lost with the G.R. 53,
the connection to 206. I.D. is in danger.
The Commander Gen. XXIII. A.K., Gen.der Inf. Hilpert, expresses in his message and at the same time,
with his thanks to the troops, the view that the force of the enemy would soon
probably be exhausted.
10. On the Ossuga and the
"buffalo's movement".
1/1 - 24/3/1943
At the beginning of 1943 the division judges the value of the troop as
follows: " the troop is strongly exerted by the hard
defensive battles in the open ground in which in addition the excavation work
had to be performed to the development of the position. The division is proud
of those, who, with high losses to the defensive success which were gained
under the most unpositive weather conditions and
battle relations, and under foreign guidance. The troop is confident and good
mood ".
Because the Div. around Poltino did not found a suitable accommodation, and which
resulted in big difficulties, the proposed XXVII.A.K. orders, a revitalization
space west and southwest near Sytschewka. On 6/1
the march of the motorized Parts of the G.R. 11 and the rail transport from
approx. 550 men of the Rgt. Begins. The horses follow
in a country march of 4 - 6 days of duration.
Till 7/1 in the evening, have arrived and have
accommodated:
Rgt. Staf in Lomy (22 kms west-southwest Sytschewka),
Stabskp. in Ssiwoje, I.
Battalion in Besymjanka
(6 kms west Lomy),
Rest of II. Battalion in
Gawrilowo (6 kms nordwest Lomy).
The Div. Staf lies at Lipka (8 kms of east southeast Lomy).
The Div. reports to the XXXIX. Pz.
Corps (Gen.der Art. Martinek).
Now also the rest parts the Div. arrive, which still
were used with 206. I.D. and 9. Pz.
Div.
All the fighting parts of the G.R. 11 were put
together in I./ll and show the following ditch-strength:
Führungsstaffel
Rgt. Stb: 3/3/11,
Stafskp.: 2/21/78
with 5 lMG,
13. Kp.: 3/17/68 with
1.s, 4 lIG,
1. Kp.: 2 / 10/34,
with 6 IMG,
2. Kp.: 2/7/62 with
6 lMG,
3. Kp.: 2/12/38 with
7 LRGO,
4. Kp.: 3/23/71 with
8 sMG, 4 sGrW, 2 Pak 3,7.
Together: 229
men l00 % mobil.
The whole grenadier's regiment 11 is melted down
almost to the half of a Battalion!
Up to 13/01 substitutes are integrated again. The Grenadier
Regiment can form scantily 2 Battalion s. It is already admirable with which
toughness and speed the troop works again on the construction of the shattered
regiment.
Because of the lack of Officers, 20 platoon leaders
are commanded to the Div. by the army-education school in Duchowtschina.
At the night of 14 to 15/1 the G.R 11 moves in
the Ossuga front, 17 kms
Southwest of Subzow. It relieves the Kgr. Muschner (II. / 233,
Till 17/1 G.R 53 closed in on the right toward Wasselki on the east bank of the river, on the right of it
K 54, just l0 days subordinated to the Rgt. Stab G.R. 84 (102. ID.).
With it 14. ID. has replaced the 102. ID. which should later again take over the
section.
The Left neighbour of the 14. Div. is the 95. ID., the right neighbour is the 216.
ID.
Till the beginning of March the Rgt.
leads a comparatively quiet static war which however, from 27/1 is led
more active by the enemy. Disturbance fire both sides, enemy air raid activity,
reconnaissance parties and combat patrol, marksman's war, position building,
observation by enemy balloons, it is the daily bread of the soldiers. The enemy
fires particularly at the railway station of Ossuga,
5 kms behind the front.
On 6/1 the G.R 11 registers the following
fight-strength again:
I. Battalion 328 heads, II. Battalion
. 313 heads.
With II. Battalion the
alarm platoons of the Div. Staf, the communications
section. and the supply troops 14 are used in
succession.
The Div. leader, colonel Holste,
takes care with a lot of swing and imagination of the well-being of the troop.
His orders which tolerate no objection, e.g. that the food of the ditch
fighters has to be more nourishing and better than that of the rest of the
soldiers, that all field boots, even private ones, had to come forward, that
the horses are maintained correctly and are fed, that recovered soldiers from
the hospital immediately come forwards, because the Div. daily had approx. 30
failures in spite of only insignificant battles. The Div. publishes a manual to
the prevention of frostbites. The Div. leader loads earned soldiers as his
guests to the Div. Staf. The troop units themselves
determine the duration of the stay! G.R. 11 gets 3 places assigned.
On 25/1 the places Sachowaika
and Schalamowo on both sides of the road are to be
assigned to the G.R. 11.
To army orders the men are to be kept winter-mobile:
Gren. Kp.
1 group, possibly 1 sMG-and 1 sGrW
group, parts of platoon and Kp. Troops, observation
troops 13. Kp., in the Stab possibly many Offz.
and 1 ski Kp. With G.R. 53.
G.R. 11 gets 40 men reinforcement from the supply
troops. So the troop can be replaced with small groups. With it some education
is also possible again.
Under guide’s courses of 3 weeks are held with the
Regiments and independent battalions. The Div. orders 1 field recruit-education
command for 80 men of the Gren. Rgt. The Div.-battle school Waraksinc l0 km holds platoon leader's courses of also 3
weeks behind the front.
At the end of January all vehicles that are not useful
are moved into the parking area of 30 kms South of Nowo
Dugino, after Merkutschewo
and Dorino. G.R. 11 keeps only 4 motorcycles, 19
passenger cars, 61 trucks and 3 Zgkw in the front.
With II./ll the new Battalion Kdr., major Von Wolffersdorf arrives. On 2/2 a lot of snow begins to
cover the ditches. They are to be kept open only here and there.
During the following day the enemy penetrates with 2.
/ ll with 15-20 men into the
MG Sappe, however, after short close combat they withdraw
again. Own losses:
2 dead persons, 2 missed, 1 wounded.
The similar repeats itself on 7/2 with II./ll. Before the Rgt. lies the Schtz. Rgt. 611 of the 88. Schtz.
Div.
On 6/2 the following strength is registered:
Ditch
strength battle strength
Rgt. Stab and Stabskp. -
6 / 19 /
l00
I. Battalion . 5/39/218 13/81/380
II. Battalion . 7/42/224 17/70/360
13. Kp. -
4/17/100
2 s, 2 lIG.
On 11/2 the Div. is included for the first time
in the preparations of the coarse retreat movement "buffalo".
Probably under the impression of the disaster of Stalingrad Hitler at last
approves to the army group and armies and demands the task to withdraw of Rshew
front. This straightening should be carried out in March - together with the
evacuation of the salient of Demjansk and a saving of
approx. 10 divisions.
The front should be taken back on the line Spask Demensk - Duchowtschina - Welish.
From the 15/2 come out numerous
orders which prepare and regulate the "buffalo's movement" down to
the last detail. Investigations
of the interpositions start. The study of the XXXIX.Pz. Corps. Writes 14., 95., 102., 337. I.D. and 2. Pz. Div. all steps of the withdraw.
On 16/2 4.
(
In the Battalion ski-mobile Pz.
Devastation troops are been formed.
Motorized column space becomes gradually with the Div.
supplies troops. G.R. 11 gives 23 trucks (3-and 5-Tonner) for the Munitions column l. / 14 and
the team transportation column 3./14. The shot guns and motionless vehicle does
slow the progresses of the low enterprise material assignment and there are too
little railway trains.
The enemy begins with stronger clarification attacks. On
17/2., 7.15 hour, approx. 200 men take after 30-minutes of fire
preparations the positions of
l. And 2. Kp. They break trough with l./ll.
After 1 hour a counterthrust has settled the position again. With own losses of
12 dead persons and 27 wounded one counts 89 enemy's dead persons and 27
wounded. The
On 20/2 the 2./Pi 14
goes back already to the building of an interposition
The Russians reaches in on 24/2., 2.45
hour, again between 1. and 2. Kp. with approximately 170 men. He breaks trough again,
however, is destroyed at
5.30 hours a part is forced to the retreat. He leaves behind l00
dead persons and 1 prisoner. Own victims: 17dead persons, 24
wounded.
The prey amounts 5 LMG, 6 flamethrowers; 33 rifles and
8 MPi. The
On 26/2 the " fortress
Sytschewka " is created, Commander becomes
colonel v. Görne, Kdr. Pz. Gren. Rgt. 304.
At the end of February, shortly before beginning of
the "buffalo's movement", thaw and rain starts. The ditches are full
with water, and the roads are partly already no more passable for Vehicles. An other big concern for the next days.
The condition of the 14. I.D. (Mot) for this moment is reported on 1st
of March:
" The battle value of the division is dropped down - 50% of the
fight-strength and of very low quality in general,
-
Questionably bad educational state of the officers Corps,
- lack of battle-tested Officers,
Necessary for the defence; Mobility: soldiers on foot;
Guidance, difficult weapons and men 80% motorized, fighting vehicles horse
drown"
The overall size of the G.R. 11:
The Stabskp. contains the Kradschtz. platoon, pioneer's
platoon, Pakzug and radio platoon, 13. Kp. possesses again 2 s, 4 Lig.
The I. Battalion has 82% and the II. Battalion 76% of his strength, 9. Kp.
still exists to 8o %.